A Quagmire in Afghanistan

By Mike Napolitano

For more than nine years now, the United States Military, in coordination with NATO forces, has been engaging in combat operations in Afghanistan. While supporters of the war state that controlling and stabilizing Afghanistan is vital to the security of the United States and its allies, opponents of the war state that the persistent presence of US military forces is actually causing a destabilization of the country. Additionally, US intervention is being scrutinized for the negative effects it is having on the social constructs in Afghanistan. This, on top of an unstable Afghani government, poses a great logistical and tactical predicament to military and political operations in the country.

Afghanistan is an interesting political anomaly. As a modern state, Afghanistan is not defined as a nation state because there is not a single dominating ethnic group that defines the country. Unlike other Central Asian countries such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan where the prominent ethnic groups are Tajiks and Uzbeks respectively, Afghanistan is compromised of various different groups including Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras (Maley). Because of these diverse groups who carry varied customs and dialects, finding a common cultural thread amongst Afghanis is nearly impossible. This assessment helps shed light on the tumultuous political atmosphere in Afghanistan.

Although Afghanis are more likely to associate themselves with individuals who share similar ethnic, tribal, and sectarian characteristics, an overwhelming majority of Afghanis are Muslim (Maley). Many Afghanis who become disgruntled with the political situation in the country are much more prone to associate themselves with an Islamist organization such as the Taliban or the Mujahedeen. This trend is seen, “even among disaffected Afghans most likely to support the Taliban,” that, “there was no evidence that ethnicity was a major worry” (Jones 12). It is clear that the Taliban, as a regional organization in Afghanistan and Pakistan, is more concerned with expelling those that they see as intruders on their territory, seen in their fighting against the Soviets in the 1980s and the Americans for the past eight years.

As the Taliban is such a rooted enemy, especially near the Pakistani border, the US military is having difficulty dealing with the insurgents. Mao Zedong once said that, “guerrillas are like fish which swim in the sea,” and that, “the sea is the civilian population, which provides the guerrillas with the support they need to survive” (Robinson 4). The difficulty then for those fighting militants is that, “counterinsurgency theory demands that the state catch the fish from the sea… to separate the insurgents from the population,” which is usually done, unfortunately, in brutal ways (Robinson 4).

Undoubtedly, the tactics used to pin-point and extricate suspected insurgents needs to be reconsidered. Currently, it seems that the course of action being taken by the US military is causing Pashtun villagers in Afghanistan to begin to, “lose faith in the American project” (Gopal 12). The trend in many villages in Afghanistan is that the villagers become victims of target bombings – where the US Military is attempting to ‘fish out’ suspected insurgents by bombing specific locations – and become supporters of the Taliban, their most convenient alternative to turn to. Instead of the use of violent means to try and ‘fish out’ suspected insurgents, many are saying that the, “best way to keep Americans safe from terrorism is through effective intelligence, expert police work and judicious homeland defense,” and that, “these practical measures cost far less than war and occupation in Muslim lands, which arouse hatred of the United States—and give strength to Islamist extremists” (vanden Heuvel 3).

The difficulty of winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of Afghanis is an interesting problem for the US government. On the one hand, “the paradox of military engagement in such a conflict is that the more you fight the more you lose” (Schell 18), where as, “the paradox of political engagement is that the more you rule the weaker the native component of the government becomes, and the more likely it is to collapse when you leave” (Schell 18). With this analogy, the costs of the war on the US efforts are clearer. While prolonged military engagement may result in relative stability and security, it also causes more casualties, more collateral damage to infrastructure, and more discontent among the citizens of both in the United States and Afghanistan. Furthermore, the longer the US remains in Afghanistan, the weaker the Afghani government will become as it will begin to rely more heavily on US support and intervention that, eventually, it will cease to function and collapse.

It is imperative for the United States government to reconsider their course of action in Afghanistan. Because President Obama has recently recommitted to US military operations, alternative theories must be present to, at the very least, combat the persistent use of violent military force. Some scholars believe that the best course of action is to involve Afghanistan’s neighbors by investing in a security initiative in the region. This can take the form of, “a major United Nations diplomatic initiative designed to get Afghanistan’s regional neighbors to join in setting a disengagement timetable and to share responsibility for preventing a Taliban return to power in Kabul” (Harrison 6). This type of solution cannot be attempted unless the US government seeks a major diplomatic initiative in Central Asia.

Afghanistan, however, cannot partake in multilateral talks with its neighbors if its own government is unstable. According to some scholars, “the collapse of governance in Afghanistan was a precondition for the onset of the insurgency” (Jones 19). This collapse of governance is rooted in the poor political management of Hamid Karzai, the Afghani president. The key to regain governance in Afghanistan is to reestablish the legitimacy of the government amongst the citizenry. It is difficult, however, for the US and Afghani governments to build relationships with Afghanis when the government isn’t functioning properly and botched military strikes are harming the civilian population. Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote in Joint Forces Quarterly that, “For all the time we spend thinking about how we communicate our actions, we are failing to actually build relationships and convince the majority Afghans not to hate us. The Taliban, on the other hand, are doing pretty well” (Xinhua News Agency). This highlights the issue quite clearly: the Taliban is taking advantage of situations created by the US and allied forces which is hurting the political and military stability of the country.

There have been efforts by the US government to set up programs and initiatives to provide social and economic support to Afghanistan. These programs, however, have been mostly unsuccessful because of mismanagement by the Afghani government. Often, projects are planned by the US government and then given to the Afghani government to appropriate funds or find a local firm to handle the project (Roston 13). The issue, however, is that President Karzai often gives projects to unqualified or corrupt individuals (ibid). In one instance, Karzai gave a $360 million security and transportation contract to his cousins who have, “no known trucking experience, and little security experience to speak of,” and who have been charged with smuggling heroin into the US during the 1990s (Roston 16). It is unfortunate that the US government does not look further into the ethical and legal shortcomings of the Karzai administration but, until they do, US funded programs are not going to function properly and the Afghani people are going to continue to suffer.

The Afghani government has so many issues to solve that it is difficult to determine where to begin. As Afghanistan is in a state of war, resolution of certain issues will take significant political, diplomatic, and social will. Additionally, the Afghani government is at a crucial juncture as it is nearing the point where it will be unable to govern because it has become too heavily reliant on US support. Beyond that, the United States has to reevaluate their commitment to Afghanistan to try and decide how long is too long to invest resources, money, and human life in the country. The US government must realize, “that the American public will not support war without end, which means [the US military will have] to leave one day” (Schell 18). The reality is that the current strategy in Afghanistan is not working and it is failing at a massive human cost. The tactics the military is using either needs to be completely reconsidered or the US needs to withdraw from Afghanistan and let Afghanis resolve their own political differences.


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